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UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
ADVISING THE CLIENT t
JE OLa) G. VAN OIs '-
T is of course true, as previously emphasized, that the
facts are all important in advising clients. This is
because proposed transactions consistent with competition
will survive even adverse per se rulings,1 whereas those con-
flicting with antitrust objectives can not be saved by the
most persuasive of past precedents.2
Nevertheless, it is likewise true that legal principles
-as distinguished from specific cases-must be applied to
these facts. For this reason guide lines marshalling the
general principles must be constructed. An illustrative
summary of the controlling principles in [five] major areas
of antitrust law is therefore presented in this Chapter.
CUSTOME PROBLEMS
Initially, the practitioner might group together the
guide lines which should control the distribution by his
client of its products and services. These principles of law
involve what are often referred to as vertical relationships,
which primarily concern the dealings of a seller with a
buyer, although they have an impact also upon the competi-
tors of each party.
t Reprinted from VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS
(Rev. ed. 1966) by permission of The Practicing Law Institute, 20 Vesey
Street, New York, New York. Footnotes appear in their original form.
* B.S. 1932, Princeton University; LL.B. 1935, Yale University.
'See, e.g., the cases cited in "Per Se Presumptions," in the preceding
Chapter IV.
2 See, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533 (1944).
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Customer Selection
The first step for a seller in dealing with purchasers is
for him to decide with whom he wishes to do business. The
statutes applicable to this selection by a seller of his cus-
tomers are sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. These statutory
provisions permit the seller to sell what he pleases, where
he wishes and to whom he desires, so long as he does not
engage in any unfair act, enter into any contract in unrea-
sonable restraint of trade, or seek to monopolize.
This means, according to the courts, that-in the
absence of any unfair, unreasonable or monopolistic conduct
-a businessman is privileged under the antitrust laws to
deal with some and to refuse to deal with others,3 to assure
those selected that they will be thus dealt with,4 and sub-
sequently to drop those deemed to be unsatisfactory.5  Even
the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, which curtails the
freedom of automobile manufacturers in dealing with their
outlets, has been held not to destroy these rights of a seller.'
This also means, however, under the uniform rulings of
the courts, that a seller should not maliciously select as
products or services to be marketed any which are merely
temporary weapons specially designed to destroy competi-
tors, such as "fighting ships" or machines.7  Neither should
3 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Ace Beer
Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 922.
4 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944);
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 352 U.S. 992 (1957); Independent
Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922.5 Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 247 F.2d 343(2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958) ; Packard Motor Car Co. v.
Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 822; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); see also Adams-Mitchell Co. v.
Cambridge Distrib. Co., 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951).6 Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.
1964) ; Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963);
Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 206 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa. 1962), a/f'd, 317 F2d
712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896.7 Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Patterson v. United States,
222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635.
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he deliberately choose as sources of supply or channels of
distribution the suppliers' or customers9 of competitors in
order to drive those competitors out of business. Finally,
he should not make his selection of products and customers
as part of an unlawful conspiracy,10 boycot 1 or attempt to
monopolize.
As recently explained, with respect to the refusal of a
TV network to deal with a station and its simultaneous
purchase of a competing station:
[I] f such a cancellation and purchase were part and parcel of unlaw-
ful conduct or agreement with others or were conceived in a purpose
to unreasonably restrain trade, control a market, or monopolize,
then such conduct might well run afoul of the Sherman Law.13
There is admittedly one substantive question as to seller
selection which cannot clearly be answered. This relates to
his right to deal or not to deal with customers as a means
of controlling their competitive activities. The old cases
broadly acknowledged his right to do so in the absence of
monopolization.' Subsequent cases have differed. 5  Other
recent cases of limited authority, in iturn, are not in agree-
ment.' Our analysis of the cases and congressional objec-
sUnited States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912); Ballard Oil Term-
inal Corp. v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 28 F.2d 91 (1st Cir. 1928).
9 Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); E. B.
Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Porto Rican Amer.
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 279 U.S. 858.
10 Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1963); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); William
H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S., 42 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 864.
11 Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914);
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).12Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
1' Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1962).
14 FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924); United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cream of
Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
15 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn.
1945); cf. United States v. New York Great A&P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949).
16 Contrast Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F2d 725 (3d
Cir. 1962) with House-of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d
867 (2d Cir. 1962).
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fives suggests that a seller may advise his customers with
respect to any competitive activity, 7 but that he may not
automatically cut them off for failure to conform to this
advice. 8 Certainly a large seller would be poorly advised
to use his right of customer selection to regiment the prices,
purchases and other competitive decisions of a nationwide
network of outlets. The condemnation by the Supreme
Court of the use by a seller of a lawful consignment ar-
rangement to effect such elimination of competition would
seem equally to ban his use of the equally lawful right to
select customers if exercised for a similar unlawful pur-
pose, for either:
[D]evice, if successful against challenge under the antitrust laws,
furnishes a wooden formula for administering prices on a vast
scale.' 9
Such coercive refusal to deal would seem to be vulner-
able not only as an unfair act, but as conduct pursuant to
implied contracts in restraint of trade. For if a seller
should threaten to cut off even one customer because the
latter has not resold at prices and under competitive condi-
tions set by the seller, the courts may find that there exist
tacit agreements between that seller and his remaining cus-
tomers pursuant to which the latter resold at such prices
and terms.20 He has then passed from the issue of his right
individually to restrain by unilateral selection of customers
to -the issue-subsequently discussed-of whether he and
his customers have the right contractually to restrain
through resale agreements.2
The Parke Davis ruling warns that when a manufac-
turer refuses to deal with customers, in accordance with a
'7 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ; Klein v. American
Luggage Works Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
is Bragon v. Hudson County News Co., 321 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1963);
Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963);
Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964) ; LeBlanc v.
Continental Oil Co., CCH 1965 Trade Cas. f 71,494 (5th Cir. 1965).
19 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 22 (1964).
20 FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) ; United States v.
Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
21 Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 203 (1921); cf. Carter
Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
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policy of controlling the resales of these customers, a court
needs little more to spell out an unlawful combination
between the manufacturer and his acquiescing customers:
When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere an-
nouncement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he
employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices,
he has put together a combination in violation of the Sherman
Act .... 22
Customer Supply
Once customers are selected, the seller will proceed to
supply them. The statutes relevant to this supply by a
seller of his outlets include principally sections 1 of the
Sherman Act, 3 of the Clayton Act and 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. These statutory provisions caution
the supplier in his use of tying, exclusive dealing, and
requirements contracts.
This legislation has been interpreted to permit a seller
to enter into such forms of agreements, with the buyers he
selects, as may be reasonably necessary to do business with
and through them. Thus he may assure an outlet that it
has been selected on an exclusive or other basis,23 and that
it will be adequately supplied.24 In addition, if the outlet
does business under the seller's franchised name, he may
require it to purchase such distinctive supplies as may be
essential to provide the public with the products associated
with that franchise name, 5 may stipulate the means by
22 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960); cf.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 402 (7th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618, rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 710.23 Lavlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 352 U.S. 992 (1957); Bascom
Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 994; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707
(1944); United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
24 Standard Oil Co. (Cal.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949);
cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
25 FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) ; Susser v. Carvel Corp.,
332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d
121 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887, rehearing denied, 370 U.S.
965; Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935),
aff'd, 299 U.S. 3 (1936); Carvel Corp., 3 CCH 1965 T.ADE REG. RE'.
17,298 (1965).
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which these supplies are delivered to the outlet,26 and may
even impose objective standards by which his outlet-if it
so elects-may patronize his competitors for such supplies."
Contracts of lease as well as sale may contain such qualified
controls, provided that:
[R]ules for use of leased machinery must not be disguised restraints
of free competition, though they may set reasonable standards which
all suppliers must meet.28
This legislation has been viewed to provide far less free-
dom to a seller, however, when he seeks to prohibit his
customers from purchasing from the seller's competitors.
At the outset, he is informed that a tying arrangement,
whereby the sale of one item is conditioned upon the pur-
chase of another, is viewed coldly. True, all tying agree-
ments are not per se unlawful, for otherwise a clothing
manufacturer could not refuse to sell a coat without accom-
panying trousers. Again, in special situations, business
necessity may justify some forms of tying. 9 But for the
most part unreasonable tying of unrelated commodities is
dangerous where either the seller has a monopoly of a
unique tying article or the volume of business in the tied
commodity is substantial.30 In addition to this caution on
tying arrangements, he is warned that a network of total
requirements contracts will be troublesome. On the one
hand, a 9mall seller may be able to prove that requirements
26 Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965).
27 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Interna-
tional Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
28 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947).
29United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Dehydrating Processing Co. v. A. 0.
Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931; Miller
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 149 F. Supp. 790 (M.D.N.C. 1957), aff'd,
252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958). Compare Kansas City Star Co. v. United
States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923, with Syra-
cuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1956).
30 United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayunne Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947); Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820.
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contracts are necessary for him to engage in business,3' a
large seller may demonstrate that they are advisable in
dealing with large buyers,32 and both may be able to prove
that they are essential in launching a new product or serv-
ice.38 On the other hand, however, a large seller at least
who is a leader in a market and is contracting with a net-
work of subservient retailers34 should proceed cautiously,
in order to ensure that he is not tending thereby to fore-
close 5 an unduly large segment of the market for too long
a period of time.3 Even substantial franchisors should not
assume that they may foreclose franchised outlets for all
products. 7 Also, no seller should seek ito foreclose competi-
tion by requirements contracts pursuant to unlawful coer-
cion," conspiracy with other sellers" or attempted mono-
poly 40
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that both the
latest Supreme Court discussion of requirements contracts
31 B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 Fed. 720 (7th Cir. 1923); cf.
United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).32Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); United
States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949); United States
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
33 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Excelsior Motor Mfg. & Supply Co. v.
Sound Equip., Inc., 73 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 706
(1935) ; General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 18 F..
Supp. 650 (D. Del. 1937); cf. Hunter Douglas Corp. v. Lando Prods., Inc.,
235 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1956).34 Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Dictograph
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940
(1955); Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954).
35 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922);
The Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
31 United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 343 U.S. 922 (1952) ; Standard Oil
Co. (Cal.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) ; FTC v. Motion Picture
Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953).
87 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Carvel Corp., 3 CCH
1965 TRADE REG. REP. 17,298; Reserve Plan Inc. v. Arthur Murray Inc.,
CCH 1965 Trade Cas. 1 71,526 (W.D. Mo. 1965).38Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
39 United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916.
40United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States
v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943), 43 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa.
1944) and 64 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd by an equally divided court,
330 U.S. 806 (1947).
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and the competitive objectives of our antitrust laws do
permit a requirements contract involving substantial pur-
chases over a substantial period of time:
[I] f only a small share of the market is involved, if the purpose
of the agreement is to insure to the customer a sufficient supply of
a commodity vital to the customer's trade or to insure to the sup-
plier a market for his output and if there is no trend toward con-
centration in the industry.41
Customer Resales
On occasion, a seller may also attempt to control the
resales of his customers. In this case, the statutes con-
cerned with such attempts by a seller to control the sales
and services of his outlets are imited to the Sherman and
Federal Trade Commission Acts. But their prohibitions of
unfair acts, unreasonable restraints and monopolizing apply
far more severely to the seller when he goes beyond select-
ing and supplying his outlets and also seeks to dictate
resales.
Interpretations of these statutory provisions permit a
supplier to impose obligations upon his dealers which will
safeguard the good will associated with his products in his
dealers' hands, and to require aggressive efforts to sell these
products. For example, a seller may designate a territory
as the primary responsibility of a particular dealer and
obligate him to use his best efforts to exploit this market.42
A seller may also establish standards with respect to clean-
liness, attractiveness and investments, 4 3 and prohibit fraud
and deception in the sales and services of his franchised
outlets.4  In particular, as recently emphasized by the
41 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962).
42 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) ; United States
V. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1965), probable
jiurisdictiom noted, 382 U.S. 936; United States v. Philco, CCH 1956 Trade
Cas. 1168,409 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (consent decree).
43 See cases cited in note 6 supra. See also Boro Hall v. General Motors
gorp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695, (1943).
1- Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 887, rehearing denied, 370 U.S. 965; Chicago Sugar Co. v.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 948 (1950) ; Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th
Cir. 1935), aff'd, 299 U.S. 3 (1936); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian
Sugar Ref. Co., 291 Fed. 29 (9th Cir. 1923).
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Federal Trade Commission, a supplier who licenses outlets
to use his trade name is not guilty of any antitrust violation
in requiring these outlets to conform to his specifications
and quality controls, including the use of his unique in-
gredients in any further manufacturing on the premises:
In our view . . . [the franchise agreement] is neither a typical
tie-in arrangement such as would render it vulnerable under the
Sherman Act, nor does it have any of the characteristics of such
an arrangement nor any other elements of unfairness such as would
subject it to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.45
Further than this a supplier must proceed cautiously.
Thus, in the absence of lawful agreements entered into
pursuant to fair trade laws," a seller may not contractually
fix the resale prices of his buyers."" For if buyers may not
agree upon their resale prices, 48 they may not do so through
the conduit of the seller .4  Again, a seller in the absence of
unusual circumstances should abstain from requiring his
buyers to resell only within a defined territory. Since
buyers may not agree upon their respective territories,"
they normally may not so contract through the seller. 1 The
seller may,'of course, offer suggestions on price and terri-
tory. But he will be well advised to distinguish carefully
between "mine" and "thine," controlling at will that which
is his, but limiting himself to non-coercive suggestions only
45 Carvel Corp., 3 CCH 1965 TRADE REG. REP. ir 17,298 at p. 22,425.
4 Hudson Distribs. Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
47 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) ; Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
48 United States y. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
49 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911);
cf. United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
50 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); cf. Holophane Co.
v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
51 See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) ; see also
United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 141 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill.
1956) ; Lowe Motor Supplies Co. v. Weed Chain Tire Grip Co., 5 CCH 1917
TRADE REG. REP. f5,506 (S.D.N.Y.); cf. United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
52 Cf. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ; United States
v. Philco Corp., CCH 1956 Trade Cas. fi 68,409 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (consent
decree).
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with respect to commodities which by sale have become
another's property.
It is true that some lower courts have sustained the
right of small sellers to control the resales of their fran-
chisees;5" but the recent Supreme Court condemnation of
franchisor-franchisee conspiracies indicates the limited ap-
plication of these rulings. 4 In any event, the increasing
opposition of our highest Court to any substantial power
at the manufacturing level to regiment competition at the
dealer level and the underlying objection of our antitrust
laws to a cartelized economy, at least, makes any coercive
restriction by a large company of dealer prices, territories
and other competitive decisions extremely hazardous. As
previously pointed out, our highest Court has no sympathy
with any device, whether of agency, consignment or sale,
involving "the utilization of economic power in one market
to curtail competition in another."5 6
DIscRIMINATION PROBLEIS
Next, the praotitioner might collect the guiding rules
which should apply to the pricing by his client of its prod-
ucts and services. These guide lines similarly relate to the
vertical relationships of a seller with a buyer. Subsequently
we will consider the price relationships of a seller with his
competitors.
Price Discriminatiom
The Robinson-Patman Act is the principal statute ap-
plicable to the prices charged by a seller to his buyer. The
provisions of the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission
5 Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963); Sandura
Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d
458 (1st Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 325 F.2d 580 (lst Cir. 1963);
Denison Mattress Co. v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Sealy Inc., CCH 1964 Trade Cas. 1171,258 (N.D. Ill. 1964),
probable jurisdiction noted, 382 U.S. 806 (1965).
5 United States v. General Motors Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383 (1966).
5 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Columbia Artists Management Inc. v. United
States, 381 U.S. 348 (1965).56 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 (1965).
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Acts, however, are also relevant. This collective legislation
imposes substantial limitations upon the freedom of a seller
to discriminate in prices between his customers.
In general, the seller is required to adopt non-discrim-
inatory policies in dealing with his customers in interstate
commerce. The Sherman and Federal Trade Commission
Acts57 as well as the Robinson-Patman Act make this advis-
able. Congress and the courts have emphasized that al-
though a seller is normally free to select or reject customers,
he is usually obliged to deal in a non-discriminatory manner
with those chosen by him:
Congress intended to assure, to the extent reasonably practicable,
that businessmen at the same functional level would start on equal
competitive footing so far as price is concerned.58
The seller's pricing policies, however, need not be rig-
idly uniform in his interstate transactions. Thus, as pre-
viously explained, a seller may initially decide in good faith
to sell a product to one customer and decline to sell it to
another,59 or continue to sell to one while terminating rela-
tionships with the other." In addition, under these statutes,
he may vary his prices from one grade and quality of a
product to another grade and quality of the same product6
if they differ more than merely in form6 and brand name.6 3
7 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948);
Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9 (D. Alaska 1965); Grand
Caillou Packing Co., CCH 1964 Ta-4mE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder) f 16,927; United States v. New York Great A&P Tea Co., 67 'F.
Supp. 626 (E.D_ Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
58 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520 (1963).
59 Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Chicago Seating Co.
v. Karpen & Bros., 177 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1949); A. J. Goodman & Sons
v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949).
60 Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 218 F.2d 202 (10th Cir.
1954);. Shaw's Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939); Sor-
rentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (g.D. Pa. 1942).
But cf. Hartley & -Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th
Cir. 1962).
61 Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 287 F.2d 265 (7th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829; Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright
Co., 141 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944); Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71
F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 590.
62 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla.
:1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951).
63 FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966) ; Hartley & Parker, Inc. v.
Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962) ; United States Rubber
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The Commission has ruled that where a commodity is in-
ferior both in physical content and in buyer appeal, it is
sufficiently differentiated to justify sales at a lower price
than that charged for the better grade of the commodity."
The seller, moreover, may cautiously discriminate in prices
in the sale of the same grade of commodity in the absence
of any showing of an appreciable threat of competitive
injury." For example, he may change his prices from
market to market, where the lower prices are equally avail-
able to all competing buyers and are neither intended to
nor do in fact appreciably endanger competition with other
sellers. 7 Likewise, he may sell at lower functional prices
to distributors than to customers competing with the cus-
tomers of the distributors, 8 and at even lower prices to
manufacturers of original equipment than to those distrib-
utors. 9 In such circumstances competition should not be
adversely affected at any level.
The seller, however, in the absence of an affirmative
showing that he can justify his conduct under one of the
provisos of the Act, may not safely sell the same grade of
commodity at substantially different prices for any substan-
Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939) and 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950); Hansen Inoculator
Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938).64 Quaker Oats, CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
1 17,134; Universal Rundel, CCH -1964 TA E REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder) 1 16,948.
65 W. F, Schrafft & Sons, CCH 1964 TRaDEREG. REP. (1963-1965 Trans-
fer Binder) 11 6,882; Admiral Corp., 3 CCH 1965 TRADE REG. REP. ff 17,230.66 Tri-Valley Packing Ass'ri v. FTC, 329. F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964);
Chicago Sugar, Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950).67 Anheuser-Busch, Inc.' v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961); Ben Hur
Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910;
Balian" Ice Cream Co. v: Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d. 356 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956), rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 928; Purex
Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100 (1954) ; General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885 (1954).
6s Gold Fuel Serv., Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 306 F2d 61 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 256 Fed. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303
(1938); cf. Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y.
1957); Edward Hruby, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)
11 16,225. But cf. Krug v, International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F.. Supp. 230
(D.NJ. .1956).
69 S. S. Kresge v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1925)-
Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953) ;. ef. United States v. E. L
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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tial period of time0 where competition may be injured
thereby. This injury may occur at the buyer level when
competition is severe, profit margins are small and the
lower prices are made available only to favored buyers.7'
Any such discrimination may not be disguised, moreover,
by granting the preferential treatment to a captive buying
intermediary owned by the favored customers," or to an
independent buying intermediary who functions only nom-
inally in the transaction of sale,7" or as a payment for serv-
ices made available only to the preferred purchasers." This
injury may also occur at the seller level when lower prices
are charged in one market than in another for the purpose
or with the probable effect of driving out of business com-
peting local sellers." Territorial price differences, like any
other discrimination, are not per se unlawful ;7" but substan-
tial, continuous and discriminatory undercutting of small
local competitors-even when those competitors thereupon
reduce their prices below the price cuts77 -may be unlawful
70 American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 954 (1964); Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964);
Sperry Rand, CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
1116,791.
7 United Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965).
72 Kaplan & Sons v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Monroe Auto
Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1009 (1966); Dayco Corp., CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder) 1 17,029; Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir.
1962); American Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884; Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512
(5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838.
73 American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 824; Purolator Prods., CCH 1964 TRADE- REG. REP. (1963-1965
Transfer Binder) 1 16,877.74 Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
923; General Foods, 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
75 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Maryland Bak-
ing Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957) ; E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC,
142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Porto Rican Amer. Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858.
- Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Corp., 349 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904; Uarco, CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-
1965 Transfer Binder) 1 16,807; Moore, CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-
1965 Transfer Binder) 16,889. Also see concurring opinion of Commissioner
Elman in Forster Mfg. Co., 3 CCH 1965 TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,304.
7 Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 959.
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in the absence of other defenses if the purpose or probable
effect is predatory."
The buyer, on its part, has substantial freedom to bar-
gain competitively for price reductions, and may not be
charged with unlawfully receiving a discriminatory price
unless it receives the price differential knowing it -to be
illegal. 9 But a buyer may be assumed to have knowingly
induced an unlawful price differential when it negotiates
for a reduction in a manner indicating either awareness of
or an indifference to its illegality. Thus a purchaser may
not join with others in setting up corporate buying offices
controlled by the organizers and obtain, by this subterfuge,
functional discounts resulting in lower net prices to these
vendees than to their competitors. 0 Again, a buyer who
deliberately seeks preferential treatment,8" or misleads a
seller into giving the buyer a lower price in order to meet
nonexistent competition, 2 evidences by such action that it
is knowingly inducing an unlawful discrimination. Indeed,
the Commission has recently warned that a buyer may
knowingly induce an unlawful discrimination where it is
not:
[C]ontent with merely getting from his regular supplier a price
that merely 'equals' the competitive price offered by the newcomer,
but might, by remaining mute and letting that supplier 'guess' at
the amount of the competitive bid, hope to get a still lower price.
. . .A buyer's silence here, if motivated by a desire to secure a
discriminatory price that 'beats' competitive offers, might very well
place the buyer himself in violation of another provision of the
statute, Section 2(f). 3
7s Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 906 (1965); Forster Mfg. Co., 3 CCH 1965 TRADE REG. REP.
17,304; Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 346 F.2d 661 (6th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904; Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 3 CCH
1965 TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,303.
79 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); Krug v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Co., 142 F. Supp. 230, 237 (D.N.J. 1956).
80 General Auto Supplier Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
dismissed, 382 U.S. 923; Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Ci.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838.
81 Fred Meyer Inc., CCH 1963 TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer
Binder) 16,368, rev'd on other grounds, CCH 1966 Trade Cas. 1 71,721 (9th
Cir. 1966).
82 Cf. United States v. New York Great A&P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949).
83 Forster Mfg. Co., 3 CCII 1965 TRADE REG. REP. ff 17,304 at p. 22,454.
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There are only a few rulings indicating whether dis-
crimination in price as part of a transaction not subject to
the Robinson-Patman Act-because not involving the sale
of a commodity-may be reached by other antitrust statutes.
To date, however, the licensing of film" and patents85 at
preferential terms to monopolistic licensees has been held
to violate the Sherman Act; the charging of rentals at vary-
ing rates injurious to competition with favored lessees has
been condemned under both the Sherman 6 and Federal
Trade Commission Acts ;"7 and even the discriminatory sale
and promotion of commodities has been reached under the
first"8 and second8 9 of these statutes as well as under the
Robinson-Patman Act. These few pioneering 'decisions and
the competitive objectives of the antitrust laws suggest,
therefore, that any pattern of substantial discriminatory
practices in licensing, leasing and servicing should be scrut-
inized carefully for their possible anticompetitive effect,
because:
[D]iscriminatory practices are included among the restraints of
trade which the Sherman Act condemns.9
Non-Price Discrimination
The Robinson-PVatman Act, in subsections (c), (A) and
(e), is the principal statute to be consulted in connection
with the non.price terms of a transaction of purchase and
sale.-. These subsections seek to prevent indirect, concealed
discrimination by a seller through arrangements for related
payments, services and facilities with favored customers.
They apply, moreover, to. transactions- in interstate and for-
8.4 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
,..5"Hartford Empire Co. v. "Tnited Stats, -323' U.S. 386, 324 U.S. 570
(1945).
I United Shoe Macit Co. v. United States; -247 U.S. 521 (1954); Laitram
Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 'F. Supp. 9' (D. Alaska 1965). -
87 Grand Caillou Packing Co., CCH 1964 TRADE RE. R. (1963-1965
Transfer Binder) f 16,927.
88 United' States v. New York Great A&P Tea Co., .173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949).
. .
89 Grand Union Co.. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. '1962) ; R H. Macy &
Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964).
90 United States v. Paramount Pictures; Inc., 334"U.S. 131, 160 (1948).
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eign commerce-whereas subsection (a) dealing with price
discrimination is limited to sales for use, consumption or
resale within the United States.
A seller would be well advised, when he formulates the
terms which are to supplement his pricing structure, not
only to adopt non-discriminatory policies in his arrange-
ments for services and facilities,91 but also to announce
publicly the terms of these arrangements.92 -Special pay-
ments or kickbacks to induce purchases by large buyers93
-unrelated to bona fide cost savings,9" functional discounts"
or services-should be avoided, even in export trade.
97
R~ather, he should ensure that all customers have access on
proportionately equal terms--either directly or through in-
termediaries 9 -- to offers of payments for advertising" and
display,1 the furnishing of display racks,2 and provision for
markdown allowances and returns.3 If he makes available
these benefits to customers of his customers, moreover, he
may be required to provide proportionate treatment through
91 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959), affirming in part
and reversing in part, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Elizabeth Arden, Inc.
v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947);
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773; Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 142 F.
Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).
92 Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962);
Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy Co., 53 F.T.C. 1050 (1957); cf. Kay
Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89 (1954); Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC,
258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
93 FTC v. Broch, 368 U.S. 360 (1962).
94 Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
95 Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 238 F. Supp. 556
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Edward Hruby, CCH 1962 TRADE REG. RE'. (1961-1963
Transfer Binder) 1 16,225.
06 Flotill Prods. Inc., CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder) 16,970.
97 Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. Ltd. v. Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829
(N.D. Ohio 1964).98Advisory Opinion No. 2, CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer
Binder) 1 17,110.
99 State Wholesale Grocers Corp. v. Great A&P Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831
(7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959) ; P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC,
267 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923.
1 American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 824.
2 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959), affirming in part
and reversing in part, 258 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
3 Kaplan & Sons v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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the outlets he contacts to all such customers competing in
the resale of his merchandise.' Where one form of benefit
is not capable of being used by some customers, he should
offer equivalent benefits which are capable of being used by
them.'
Buyers knowingly receiving special payments, discrimi-
natory allowances or preferential facilities, it might be add-
ed, are equally liable with the seller-either under the
Robinson-Patman or under the Federal Trade Commission
Acts.6
The law is not settled concerning what general terms of
a transaction-e.g., those involving credit-must also be
non-discriminatory. Apparently, however, the granting of
better credit terms to one purchaser than to an equally
solvent competing purchaser may raise problems.' In addi-
tion, the grant of consignment privileges or returns for
credit to some but not all competing customers may be vul-
nerable.' At least it is best to avoid exposing either seller
or buyer to the charge that the terms of their relationships
represent:
[D]iscrimination in the terms of the sale [which] operated to
permit the favored customers to purchase at a lower price than
other customers, so that their only practical effect was to establish
discrimination in price, precisely the evil at which the statute was
aimed.9
4 Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956);
Fred Meyer, Inc., CCH 1963 TRADE REG. REIP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)
1 16,368, rezd, CCH 1966 Trade Cas. 71,721 (9th Cir. 1966).
5 Sunbeam Corp., CCH 1965 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder) 11 17,178; Lever Bros., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953) ; see, e.g., Statement of
FTC Accompanying Trade Practice Conference Rules for the Cosmetic and
Toilet Preparations Industry, effective February 1, 1952, 3 CCH TRtAE REG.
REP. f 20,221, and FTC Guides for Allowances and Services; Compliance
with § 2(d) and (e) (1960).S R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); Grand Union
Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); Swanee Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
7 U.S. Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939); yeast cases, i.e., Yeast Corp.,
33 F.T.C. 701 (1941); National Grain Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 684 (1941);
and Federal Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 1372 (1941); cf. Vandalia R.R. v. United
States, 226 Fed. 713 (7th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 642.
8 Ludwig v. American Greetings Corp., 264 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1959).
9 Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 740 (1945).
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Justified Discrimination
The forms of discrimination prohibited in the manner
described in the above discussion, nevertheless, may be jus-
tified if they conform to certain limited affirmative defenses
recognized by the Robinson-Patman Act.
First, discrimination in price by a seller is permissible
if it represents merely the sale of distress" or obsolete"
merchandise to a few of the seller's customers.
Second, both discrimination in price, and discrimination
in payments for or furnishing of services and facilities are
proper if these preferences are extended in good faith to
meet the equally low price, payments or services and facili-
ties of a competitor. 2 The Federal Trade Commission as
well as the courts is currently recognizing this defense,"
provided that the seller limits himself to defensive rather
than to aggressive 4 action in individuaP5 competitive situa-
tions. The essential prerequisites in raising this test are
that the seller must be acting (1) in good faith and (2) to
meet equivalent conduct of his-rather than his customer's
-competitor." 6 Roughly speaking, this means that he may
act without fear, provided that there are not additional
facts which indicate that he is thereby seeking to imple-
ment an indefensible trade practice, an unlawful conspiracy
or a plan of monopoly. Thus a seller would not be acting
20See Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 190 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 902 (1952); Huber v. Pillsbury Flour, 30 F. Supp. 108
(S.D.N.Y. 1939).
"I Satori v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., CCH 1964 Trade Cas. 1171,309
(S.D. Cal. 1964); Valley Plymouth v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 219 F.
Supp. 608 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
22 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); Exquisite Form
Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
888 (1962) ; Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Sunshine
Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
"3 Continental Baking Co., CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Trans-
fer Binder) 1 16,720; Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., CCH 1964 TRADE
REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 16,814.
'4 Compare Forster Mfg. Co., 3 CCH 1965 TRADE REG. REP. 11 17,304,
with Sunshine Biscuits Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
I' Compare Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP.
(1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 1 16,753, with Beatrice Foods Co., CCH 1965
TRADE REG. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) 1117,071.
16 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
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in good faith if with knowledge of its illegality"7 he copied
verbatim an unlawful basing point or quantity discount
structure of an individual competitor or joined a conspira-
torial industry-wide price structure of numerous competi-
tors.'" Nor would he be acting in good faith if he cut prices
to meet the low price levels of inferior merchandise in order
maliciously to exclude it from, and thereby monopolize, the
market.19 Above all, the seller must be seeking to meet,
not to undercut and destroy, his competition:
the statute at least requires the seller, who has knowingly discrin-
inated in price, to show the existence of facts which would lead a
reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a
lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a com-
petitor.20
Finally, discrimination in price-but not with respect
to services and facilities2 -- is lawful if the price differen-
tials make only due allowance for differences in cost result-
ing from differing methods or quantities of sale or delivery.
This defense requires a seller initially to segregate those of
his costs which vary with differences in methods or quan-
tities of sale and delivery. Any such segregation must be
achieved by recognized accounting techniques, such as sam-
pling,12 because estimates 28 and past company procedures 24
are rejected unless supported by a factual basis justifying
their use.2" This defense next requires the seller .to allocate
'17 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334
(1959); Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956).
Is FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957) ; FTC v. Cement
Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746
(1945).
19 Porto Rican Amer. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F2d 234
(2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858; Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C.
277 (1957), reVd on other grounds, 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
20 FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945).
21FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959), affirming in part
and reversing in part, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1958).22 Advisory Committee on Cost Justification, Report to the FTC (1956).
23 Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 43 (1953).
-24 Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121 (1939), 30 F.T.C. 1117 (1940), 46
F.T.C. 1485 (1950), aft'd, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
25 Philadelphia Carpet Co. v. FTC, CCH 1964 TR"E Ra. REP. (1963-
1965 Transfer Binder) f 16,801, aff'd per curiam, 342 F.2d 944 (3d Cir.
1965).
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his costs, thus segregated, among reasonable customer
classifications. Recently, certain cost studies have been re-
jected because of failure by sellers to place purchasers into
groups whose members were of such selfsameness as to
make the averaging of the cost of dealing with a group a
valid indicium of the cost of dealing with individual group
members.26  Finally, the seller must compare the differences
in the prices charged those groups with the differences in
the costs allocated to those groups, in order to determine
whether the former make only due allowance for the latter.
On occasion, the prices and costs of selling a complete line
of products may be so compared.27 In this evaluation, a
rule of reason must be employed, and where a price differ-
ence seems in good faith to be justified by a cost differen-
tial,29 any de minimis failure of minor steps or of minor
percentages"0 to be cost justified may be disregarded. This
rule of reason, incidentally, is more favorably invoked by
cost studies made in advance of litigation than by ex post
facto accounting rationalization."'
It has been said that this third affirmative defense of
cost justification is of little value because the courts and
the Commission, in their rejection of accounting studies
allocating costs among customer groups, in effect require
cost comparisons to be made customer by customer. This
statement, however, is incorrect. The Supreme Court, while
rejecting arbitrary customer groupings, has expressly ap-
proved the practice of comparing average costs with average
prices on the basis of reasonable customer classifications:
We ourselves have noted the 'elusiveness of cost data' in a Robin-
son-Patman Act proceeding. Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal
26 United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); Borden Co., CCH
1962 TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder) 16,191; American
Motors Corp., 3 CCH 1965 TAD- REG. REP. 1 17,297; Foremost Dairies, Inc.,
CCH 1963 TADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) ff 16,435.
27 Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 51 F.T.C. 282 (1954).
28 Id. at 291, n.15.29 American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir.
1951); Minneapolis-Honeyvell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 44 F.T.C. 351, 394(1948), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 206 (1952).
so B. F. Goodrich Co., 50 F.T.C. 622 (1954).
31Thompson Prods. Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1252 (1959); United States Rubber
Co., 46 F.T.C 998 (1950).
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Trade Comii'n, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953) . . . [T]o completely
renounce class pricing as justified by class accounting would be to
eliminate in practical effect the cost justification proviso as to sellers
having a large number of purchasers, thereby preventing such sellers
from passing on economies to their customers. It seems hardly
necessary to say that such a result is at war with Congress' language
and purpose.32
COMPLVMEvJ PROBLEMS
The problems of a client include, of course, not only its
vertical seller-buyer relationships, but also its horizontal
dealings with its competitors. Both relationships affect
competition between the client and the other members of
the industry involved. The latter, however, raises separate
issues which merit separate treatment We might com-
mence our analysis of these further horizontal problems,
therefore, by considering individual competitive practices.
Competitive Conduct
The unilateral acts and practices of a businessman in
competing with other members of the industry may raise
issues under several of the antitrust statutes, even where
he does not enter into any direct dealings with his competi-
tors. Thus, for example, price discrimination and exclusive
dealing contracts will involve the IRobinson-Patman and
Clayton Acts, with which we have just dealt. The most
all-embracing legislation applicable to the single actions of
a company, however, is section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
A seller or a buyer is normally free to engage in any
business conduct under this Act so long as he avoids unfair
methods injurious to his competitors and unfair or decep-
tive acts which are harmful ito his suppliers and purchasers.
Indeed, he is encouraged by the antitrust laws to use his
ingenuity in taking any reasonable commercial action in the
course of developing new products33 and expanding his busi-
32United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 468 (1962).
3 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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ness.3 4 The mere fact that he is successful in his business
conduct will not expose him to attack, even though it may
cause difficulties to his rivals."
A business organization is not free, however, to engage
in practices characterized by bad faith, fraud or oppres-
sion. 6 Thus he should not engage in predatory price cuts,"
unreasonable forms of tying and total requirement de-
vices3" or coercion3 9 to foreclose his competitors' sales; nor
use fictitious price tickets, 0 misleading names, 1 or gambling
devices4 2 to promote his own sales. Again, he should keep
in mind, in his advertising, "the Commission's insistence
that the public be not misinformed." 3
It might be noted that there are two practices, widely
employed in some industries, which today are particularly
under attack as unfair. The first practice involves the
coercive use of reciprocity, whereby a company will utilize
substantial purchasing power in withholding the purchase
of commodities from a supplier in order to force the latter
to buy in turn from the former. The oppressive employ-
ment of this device has long been vulnerable under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act,44 and recently has been con-
demned in Sherman 5 and Clayton 6 Act proceedings. The
second practice concerns selling below cost for the purpose
34United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
35 FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
36 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
3T Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
38 United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
39 United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
40 Helbros Watch Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 976 (1963); Heavenly Creation Inc. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 955; Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d
608 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962) ; Clinton Watch Co. v.
FTC, 291 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 952 (1962).
4' FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
42 FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
4' FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 390 (1965). See also
FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
44Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16
F.T.C. 67 (1932); California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937).
45United States v. General Dynamics Corp., CCH 1965 Trade Cas.
171,518 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
46 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) ; United States
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d
Cir. 1963).
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of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
Conduct of this nature has resulted in a $380,000 fine for a
corporate defendant and a three-month (suspended) jail
sentence plus a $52,500 fine for an individual defendant."
Reciprocity and below cost sales are not, however, per se
unlawful. The Supreme Court itself has reassured industry
that the use of reciprocity in de minimis situations is un-
objectionable, even in section 7 proceedings,8 and that sell-
ing below. cost is not banned:
[W]here made in furtherance of a legitimate commercial objective,
such as the liquidation of excess, obsolete or perishable merchandise,
or the need to meet a lawful, equally low price of a competitor.49
Competitive Contacts
The acts and practices of a businessman raise further
issues under the antitrust laws, nevertheless, when they are
accompanied by direct dealings on his part with competi-
tors. Au inference at times is drawn under these circum-
stances that such conduct, when accompanied by conscious
parallel action, represents evidence of an unlawful con-
spiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act as well
as section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Fortunately, the more recent decisions hold that a busi-
nessman in selecting his customers, quoting his prices and
engaging in normal business practices is no longer assumed,
in the absence of proof of direct dealings with his competi-
tors, to be prima facie guilty of conspiracy merely because
of similar conduct by his competitors." Earlier cases5' to
the contrary are now 'to be discounted.
47 National Dairy Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965),
remanded, 384 U.S. 883 (1966).
48 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
49 United States v. National Dairy Co., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963).
50 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954) ; Brown v. Western Mass. Theatres, Inc., 288 F.2d 302 (1st Cir.
1961); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297
F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962) ; United States v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
51FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Triangle Conduit & Cable
Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd sub nora. Clayton Mark &
Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
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Accordingly, if a seller will take a few elementary pre-
cautions to make clear his independence of his competitors,
he should have no fear of any such conspiracy charges. To
illustrate, from the teachings of old and new cases, every
important decision of a seller as to price which follows or
may be followed by his competitors should be taken only
after internal deliberations, carefully recorded, which are
not preceded by discussions with competitors.2 Other im-
portant decisions of a seller which may accompany indus-
try-wide changes in established practices might well conform
to a similar procedure." Outward indications of less than
rugged competition, eg., in friendly discussions with com-
petitors of internal policies and in unusual disclosures to
them of competitive secrets, should particularly be avoided 4
because they provide opportunities for inferences of unlaw-
ful agreements when competitors happen to follow similar
policies:
A friendly relationship within . . . a long established industry is,
in itself, not only natural but commendable and beneficial, as long
as it does not breed illegal activities. Such a community of interest
in any industry, however, provides a natural foundation for working
policies and understandings favorable to the insiders and unfavor-
able to outsiders.55
In addition, uniform solutions by competitors of com-
mon industry problems should be rechecked from time to
time to ensure that practices originally adopted by inde-
pendent action of individual competitors have not: degen-
erated into implied understandings between them. Thus
industry-wide favoring of customers who no longer repre-
sent the most desirable outlets," or parallel quotation by
52 See, e.g., the Gary dinners in United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), and the competitive contacts' in Morton Salt Co.
v. United States, 235 72d 573 "(10th Cir. 1956)." SlC
53 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v., United States, 306 U.S. 203 (1939).
54 United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923);
American Colunin & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
55 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781; 793 (1946).
5Q United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); see
also the-subsequent treble-damage actions against the Paramount defendants,
e.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribs., 346 U.S. 537
(1954).
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numerous sellers of prices f.o.b. plants which have been
abandoned," or uniform acquiescence by licensees in re-
straints after the significant patents have expired," may
suggest continuation, by some secret intercompany concert
of action, of individual practices once lawfully conceived.
Where there is danger that a course of action by a busi-
nessman will be inferred to be part of an unlawful industry
conspiracy, it would be well to break cleanly with the past59
through:
[A]n overt and visible reversal of policy, carried out by extensive
operations which have every appearance of being permanent.
6 0
The most controversial question raised by recent rul-
ings involves the effect of any systematic exchange of
current price lists among competitors. Needless to say, such
an exchange after prices have previously been independently
established does not, without more, spell out a conspiracy, 1
nor does an independent decision to follow a listed price
make the price follower a conspirator.2 The exchange of
prices, plus uniformity in prices, plus systematic discussion
of those prices before and after their publication, however,
add up to a totality which has been viewed by some courts
as vulnerable to attack."3 Under these circumstances, a
company which believes itself forced to follow the prices of
a competitor might consider dispensing with the luxury of
exchanging and/or discussing those prices with his com-
petitor.
57 Compare FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948), with Cement Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
58 Compare United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J.
1953), with United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
59 United States v. National Ass'n of Leather Glove Mfrs., CCH 1954
Trade Cas. 167,842 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
60 United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 334 (1952).
01 United States v. Ward Baking Co., 343 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
62 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963).
63 Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Morton Salt Co., CCH 1964 Trade Cas. f[ 71,198 (D. Minn. 1964);
United States v. Morton Salt Co., CCH 1964 Trade Cas. 1 71,304 (D. Minn.
1964).
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Competitive Contracts
The agreements of a businessman with his competitors,
as distinguished from his unilateral acts, are similarly sub-
ject to scrutiny under both the Sherman and Federal Trade
Commission Acts. The application of these statutes to his
agreements, however, has been more clearly spelled out in
recent years.
A composite analysis of recent and prior decisions-in
the light of current views with respect to the competitive
objectives of our antitrust laws-indicates that competitors
should be safe so long as they enter into contractual rela-
tionships with each other (through trade associations or
otherwise) solely in order to improve the opportunities of
each to compete. Thus the collection, averaging and distri-
bution without editorial comment of industry statistics with
respect to past transactions contributes greatly to the effec-
tiveness of competition by small and large competitors alike
and should be upheld 64-that is to say, provided that there
is no commitment on the part of industry members to take
agreed action thereon 5 and if undue disclosure of the facts
relating to individual members or customers is avoided.6
Again, the creation bycompetitors of industry service or-
ganizations available to all should be permissible. 7 These
horizontal contractual relationships between competitors
should, of course, be accompanied by convincing evidence
that competition is nevertheless continuing unabated. 8
-Competitors would be well advised, however, to abstain
in the future, except insofar as authorized by Congress, from
horizontal contractual relationships with each other of a
formal or informal nature directed toward restricting the
6 Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
65 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
6United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923);
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
67 W. P. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R1, 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 830; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945);
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
68 Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949) ; United States v.
Chicago Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 123 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
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freedom of each to compete.69 Businessmen should be in-
formed that in the absence of clear affirmative justification0
they should avoid agreeing with competitors upon the prices,
terms and conditions upon which they will purchase7' or
sell," the markets in which they will do business, 3 or the
persons with whom they will deal."' They should also ab-
stain from horizontal agreements with respect to procedures
for forecasting the future prices and production of mem-
bers," the elimination of competitive products," joint action
to enter into fair-trade77 and compulsory arbitration agree-
ments," and any similar activity which indicates an arrange-
ment to create:
[A]n extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the
regulation and restraint of interstate commerce.79
69 Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir.
1964) ; Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Bryant-Buckner Associates, 333 F.2d 202
.(4th Cir. 1964); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); United
States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
70 Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963) ; Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, Inc.,
265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v.
National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa, 1953).7 1 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196-U.S. 375 (1905).
72 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927),
73 Holophane Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ; United States v.
National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; Nationwide Trailer Refital Sys., Inc.
v. United States, 355 U.S. 10 (1956), affirming CCH 1955 Trade Cas.
68,101 (D. Kan. 1955); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., '105
F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
7 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959);
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. A45 (1957); ,Biziderup v.
Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923); Eastern States Lumber Ass'a v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).7 5 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 427 and 324 U.S.
570 (1945); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377
.(1921). .: , " " • .
76 National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965);
United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Milk & Ice Cream
Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946). ,
77 United States v; Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945) ; cf.
United States, v. Food & Grocery Bureau of So. Cal., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 974
(S.D. Cal. 1942), aftd, 139 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1943).
78 United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S.. 44 (1930) ; Para-
mount Famous' Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
7? Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc.'v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465
(1941).
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Competitors should realize, moreover, that evasion of
these rulings by concealment is becoming increasingly dif-
ficult. For example, an unnatural uniformity of action
between competitors, 0 such as raising prices simultaneously
in a depression,8 may invite an investigation to determine
the reasons for this phenomenon. As previously indicated,
parallel action between competitors by itself is meaningless;
but, when it produces a result which is inconsistent with
competition, it stimulates the interest of government prose-
cutors to determine how it came about. Justification from
implied exemptions from the antitrust laws, furthermore, is
becoming increasingly difficult. 2 For where concerted action
is not expressly exempt from ,the antitrust laws:
[A] ny repealer of the antitrust laws must be discerned as a matter
of principle, and "[i]t is a cardinal principle of construction that
repeals by implication are not favored."8 3
The most difficult area in which to anticipate future
antitrust rulings on horizontal competitive relationships be-
tween' competitors is that with respect to joint ventures.
Increasing criticism of such joint arrangements is being
heard today in government circles. There is reason to be-
lieve, however, on the basis of our legislative approach, that
reasonably limited cooperative business ventures between
competitors will still be upheld. The following may be the
rules of the future: On the one extreme, a long-term elimina-
tion of competition in the United States between substantial
companies which are actual or potential competitors in an
industry, through jointly-backed ventures, may not be jus-
tified by the phrase "joint venture."84 On the other extreme,
short-term ventures by large segments of an industry 5 and
80 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
81 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
82 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
83 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
84 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) ; Virginia Excelsior
Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958); cf. United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).85 Prairie Farmer Publishing Co. v. Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing
Co., 88 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 696; United States v.
Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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even long-term enterprises formed by groups of small busi-
nessmen, 6 where the purpose and effect is to provide new
products, improve old products, promote additional sales
and supply new facilities-where consistent with competi-
tion-should be permissible. In between these two extremes,
large and small companies should equally be entitled to
participate as investors and owners at least in the creation
of new self-contained business organizations for the develop-
ment and/or production of new products or to provide new
competition in markets which the parent companies could
not separately invade." The participants in these latter,
self-contained joint ventures should of course avoid any
undue exchange of competitive secrets through the conduit
of the new venture,8 and refrain from any agreement elim-
inating all interparent competition. 9 But as the Supreme
Court has emphasized, such a new, self-contained venture
should be condemned only if:
[E] ither one of the corporations would have entered the market..
[of the venture] while the other would have remained a significant
potential competitor.90
PATENT PROBLEMS
The horizontal problems of a client also include, of
course, -those involving his patents, since patents grant to
86 Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1959); Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.
1957); Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn.
1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 635 (1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949; United States
v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 CCH Trade Cas. 169,761 (S.D. Ohio
1960).
87 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956);
United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); United
States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1915), appeal
dis ,issed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921); cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).
s8 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.
Mass. 1950).
s9United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Far-
benfabriken Bayer A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 929 (1963); United States v. Associated Patents, Inc.,
134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd sub twin. Mac Inv. Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 960 (1956).
10 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 175 (1964).
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a patentee the right to exclude or to permit competition
between members of an industry, and thus affect primarily
their horizontal relationships. To complete our considera-
tion of the horizontal aspects of a company, therefore, we
turn to patents.
Patent Practices
At the outset, we find that the very acquisition and en-
forcement of patent rights may raise antitrust issues, even
if no license is ever granted under these rights. Any such
activity must run the gauntlet of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, section 7 of the Clayton Act, and section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
A businessman has a right guaranteed both by statute9 '
and by the Constitution92 to apply for and obtain a patent
covering the claims of an invention conceived by him. The
antitrust statutes listed above, however, caution him to
avoid fraud 93 or conspiracy 9  in the procurement of this
patent if he wishes to be able to enjoy and enforce against
others the patent monopoly thereby secured. He similarly
has the right to acquire patents covering the inventions of
others,95 unless this acquisition is part of a larger plan to
control competition, e.g., by suppressing competing pa-
tents 90 or .through undertaking by agreement with second
parties to exclude third parties from the market. In
either such event the acquisition may also raise problems
9135 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
92 UNITED STATES CONSznTTION, Art. 1, § 8.9 3 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965) ; Clinton Engines Corp. v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 175 F. Supp.
390 (E.D. Mich. 1959); Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238, 324 U.S. 570 (1944).
04 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) ; concurring
opinion of White, J., in United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174
(1963); Matter of American Cyanamid Co., CCH 1963 TRADE REG. REP.
(1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 16,527, order modified 1116,699, ree'd on
other grounds, BNA ANTTrRtuST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 258, p. A-13 (June
21, 1966).
Or Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637
(1947).96 Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 166 Fed. 555 (D. Mass.
1909).
97 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
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under section 7 of the Clayton Act.9" Finally, he may en-
gage in the practice of accumulating patents covering his
own or others' inventions,99 but here again the antitrust
laws caution him not -to do so as part of an aggressive plan
of securing exclusive right to all available patents.'
Once he has obtained patents, moreover, the owner ordi-
narily is entitled -to use them or not as he pleases,2 and to
license them exclusively or nonexclusively.3 These rights,
however, are conditioned by antitrust rulings warning him
not to give a veto power over such licensing to nonexclusive
licensees.4 Furthermore, he may enforce those patents
against infringers, but -only so long as he does not threaten
infringement suits which he never intends to bring or win,5
or does not press such suits merely because of failure on
the part of the defendant to purchase from him noninfring-
ing supplies.'
98 Smith-Corona Marchant Inc. v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 217 F.
Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F.
Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).99 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Htazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950).
1 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 324 U.S. 570
(1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), af'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
2 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405
(1908); Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945); United States v.
L. D. Caulk Co., 126 F. Supp. 693 (D. Del. 1954); F.A.D. Andrea, Inc. v.
RCA, 14 F. Supp. 226 (D. Del. 1936), aff'd, 88 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 681. But cf. Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation, 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 876 (1945).3 Virtue v. Creamery Package Co., 277 U.S. 8 (1913); Transparent-
Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947); Benger
Labs. Ltd. v. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d
455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833. But cf. Vitamin Technologists,
Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944),
cert. dettied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945).
4 Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); United States
y. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd men., 353 U.S. 5 (1957) ;
United States v. Associated Patents, 134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1955),
aff'd sub nor. Mac Inv. Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 960 (1956); Clapper v.
Original Tractor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1959), cert denied, 361
U.S. 967. But cf. Bengar Labs. Ltd. v. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa.
1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833.
5 Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938) ; cf. Kobe, Inc. v.
Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
837.
6 Mercoid Corp. v., Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Switzer Bros., Inc. v.
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In his acquisition and enforcement of his patent rights,
the patentee should keep in mind that his practices are not
only subject to judicial scrutiny, but also to the recently
assumed jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. It
is the position of the Commission that it may strike down
even:
IF] raud, unclean hands, inequitableness or bad faith, or any border-
line behavior before the Patent Office.7
Patent Licenses
Once ,the patentee decides to grant licenses, of course,
he will become a party to contractual arrangements which
are traditionally subject to antitrust review, and he must
therefore take care to avoid unreasonable or unfair restric-
tions in those licenses in violation of the Sherman and/or
Federal Trade Commission Acts.
A safe rule of thumb for the patentee to follow in
issuing his licenses is to assume that he will have no prob-
lem under the antitrust laws so long as he merely grants
such limited or unlimited rights as he desires to extend to
his licensees. Thus he should be free to license one or more
patents ' for one or more fields, markets or products. 9 He
would be well advised, howevet, not to go further and im-
pose contractual covenants which control the competitive
decisions of his licensees, e.g., by requiring them to agree
to -take more patents than they desire,"0 to refrain from
Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962); Cf.
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
7American Cyanamid Co., CCH 1963 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965
Transfer Binder) 16,527 at p. 21,425, order ,nodified 16,699, rev'd on other
grounds, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 258, p. A-13 (June 21,
1966).
8 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950); Blinks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252
(7th Cir. 1960).
9 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175
(1938); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisell & Co., 86 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 667 (1937); Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co.,
211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
10 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948);
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) ; American Securit Co. v.
Shatterproof Glass Co., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
902.
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competing in specified markets11 or with alternative prod-
ucts,12 to resell at the prices "3 and to -the persons " dictated
by the licensor, and to buy certain products from the
licensor."5  In addition, covenants relating to quotas,"0
grant-backs," contesting validity' 8 and conduct arising
after the expiration of patents 1 have been challenged.
There is no per se prohibition of all of such covenants, of
course, because even tying clauses2" and compulsory grant-
11 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; United States
v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1956). But cf. Scapa
Dryers, Inc. v. Abney Mills, 269 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 901; Prestole Corp. v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 146 (6th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960).
12 McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Berlen-
bach v. Anderson Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 830; Waco-Porter Corp. v. Tubular Structures Corp., 222 F.
Supp. 332 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
13 United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); Newburgh Moire Co. v.
Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956). But cf. United States v.
Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd, 382 U.S. 197
(1965).
14 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); F. C. Russell Co. v. Con-
sumers Insulation Co., 226 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1955).
15 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); cf. United
States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) ; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). But cf. Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid
Sys., Inc., 231 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1956).
16 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 324 U.S. 570
(1945); American Equip. Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406
(7th Cir. 1934) ; United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ.
1949). But cf. Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657 (D.N.J.
1951), aff'd, 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935.
27 United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 816 (D.N.J. 1949);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
But cf. International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
IsUnited States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1947), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224
(1892): United States v. Standard Oil Co., 33 F.2d 617, 630 (N.D. Ill. 1929),
aff'd, 283 U.S. 163, 181 (1931).
19 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcallus Mfg. Co., Inc., 326 U.S. 249 (1945);
Prestole Corp. v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied. 361 U.S. 964 (1960); Geo. W. Ashlock Co. v. Atlas-Pacific
Eng'r Co., 225 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
20 Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Sys., Inc., 231 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1956);
Dehydrating Processing Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.
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backs 2 have been upheld; and there may be some life left
in earlier rulings approving provisions reasonably neces-
sary to secure to the licensor the fruits of his inventions.2 2
Nevertheless, such contractual covenants, whether or not
they are lawful considered by themselves, may be viewed
as vulnerable when inserted in a pattern of licenses alleged
to control competition in an industry. In such a case, a
court may hold that illegality:
[F]ollows despite the assumed legality of each separate patent
license, for it is familiar doctrine that lawful acts may become
unlawful in concert.23
A patentee, moreover, will have to proceed with par-
ticular care in his contractual arrangements where the
patent rights flow to as well as from the licensor. Ap-
parently it is more blessed for a patentee to give, than to
receive, a license. When two patentees cross-license each
other, practices which might be innocent of restraint in a
unilateral license may represent actual restraints in a
bilateral license, and the courts will scrutinize such two-
way licenses to determine whether that is or is not the
case.2 4 Thus a downstream exclusive license in effect merely
conveys the patent rights of one to another, whereas an
exchange of exclusive licenses may in some eases debar
each from competing in the market of the other.25 Like-
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931; see United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afg'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567
(1961). Section 271(b)-(d) of 1952 Patents Code, 35 U.S.C. §271 (1964);
Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1956);
Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 851 (1962).
21 Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637
(1947) ; Zajicek v. Koolvent Metal Awning Corp. of America, 283 F.2d 127
(9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 859 (1961).2 2 United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
23 United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 401 (1948).
24 Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) ; Baker-
Camnack Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824; Cutter Labs v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d
80 (9th Cir. 1949) ; cf. Affiliated Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc., 268
F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 831.
25 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v.
Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd sub norn.
Mac Inv. Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 960 (1956).
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wise, a patentee who designates a licensee -to sublicense for
him merely substitutes one licensor for another; whereas
two patentees who contract to make one of them exclusive
licensor -have decreased the number of licensors from two
to one, and this may in some instances raise antitrust
problems." The necessity for reasonable precautions in
entering into cooperative research with attendant cross-
licenses, however, should not deter their bona fide use
throughout an industry, for:
The development of patents by separate corporations or by cooperat-
ing units of an industry through an organized research group is a
well known phenomenon. However far advanced over the lone
inventor's experimentation this method of seeking improvement in
the practices of the arts and sciences may be, there can be no
objection, on the score of illegality, either to the mere size of such
a group or the thoroughness of its research.2 7
Patent Royalties
In recent years, additional problems have also arisen
in connection with the royalties charged in patent licenses.
These questions have involved both the Sherman and the
Federal Trade Commission Acts.
It is clear that under these statutes a patentee may
charge whatever royalty he desires, measured by whatever
patented or unpatented royalty base he wishes, and for
as long a period of time as he elects, so long as his royalty
provisions are agreeable to his licensees who are making
-the royalty payments." Thus, it is entirely lawful under
these circumstances for him to engage in package licensing,
whereby he collects a uniform royalty for the use by his
licensees of a changing number of present and future
patents.29
26 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 311 (1948); cf.
Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).27 United States v. Line Material Co., note 26 supra, at 310.
28 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950); Ohio Citizens Trust Co. v. Air-Way Elec. Appliance Corp., 56 F.
Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ohio 1944); Hanks v. Ross, 200 F. Supp. 605 (D. Md.
1961).2 9Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827(1950); Sbicca-Del Mac Inc. v. Milius Shoe Co., 145 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.
1944); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.
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It is not clear, however, how far a patentee may go
when his royalty procedures are not acceptable to his li-
censees. In certain situations he may have to yield to
licensee objections to his rates. For example, he may be
required by the antitrust laws to differentiate in his royalty
rates when a licensee wishes to pay a lower royalty than
he is charging other licensees, for the use of substantially
less valuable patent rights than are used by other licensees."
In contrast, he may be denied by these statutes the right to
discriminate in his rates should he desire to charge a lower
royalty to a favored licensee in order to give it an unreason-
able competitive advantage over other licensees.31 In addi-
tion, these laws may question his right to discriminate if
the licensor intends the discrimination to force licensees to
purchase from him unpatented supplies. 2  Other royalty
problems also may arise, as, e.g., in the event that he seeks
to coerce licensees into accepting royalty provisions requir-
ing payments to be measured by a royalty base of un-
patented parts 33 or of patented products after all relevant
patents have expired."4
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 901; Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v.
Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1, 49-50 (D. Md. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d
497 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826.
30 American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Co., 154 F. Supp. 890 (D.
Del. 1957), aff'd, 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902;
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1965); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 65 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ohio
1945) (final judgment); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, CCH
1958 Trade Cas. 69,164 (S.D.N.Y.) (consent judgment).
31 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 324 U.S. 570
(1945); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948);
Grand Caillou Packing Co., CCH 1964 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder) 116,927; cf. the proviso to paragraph 13(A) (2) of the final judgment
in United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 65 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ohio 1945)
final judgment, providing for denial of an application for a license of individ-
ual-as distinguished from a package of-patents "upon a showing that the
granting of such application probably will result in inequitable discrimination
as between licensees or unduly burden the Court."
32 Barber Asphalt Corp. v. La Fera Crecco Contr. Co., 116 F.2d 211
(3d Cir. 1940) ; Dehydrators, Ltd. v. Petrolite Corp., 117 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.
1941) ; National Foam Sys., Inc. v. Urquhart, 202 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1953).
33 Compare Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Aro Mfg. Co., Inc.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964).34 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Ar-Tik Sys., Inc. v. Dairy
Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962). Also, Technograph Printed Cir-
cuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp, 1, 49-50 (D. Md. 1963),
aff'd, 327 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826; American
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Two principles may be helpful, however, in resolving
most royalty disputes of a patentee with his licensees:
First, the objective of the patentee should be to obtain
a reasonable reward for the licensed use of his patented in-
vention. Neither the royalty nor any other provisions of
his license agreement, when they are considered as a whole,
should seek merely to profit from the suppression of com-
petition in the industry involved, for:
The rewards which flow to the patentee and his licensees from the
suppression of competition through the regulation of an industry
are not reasonably and normally adapted to secure pecuniary reward
for the patentee's monopoly.3 5
Second, a patentee who is merely seeking a reasonable
reward for the use of his patented invention should he able
to utilize any reasonable royalty yardstick to measure the
value of that use. Thus a licensor who grants a package
license should not be required to justify on any arithmetical
basis a royalty rate for less than the complete package "
so long as he is not seeking to force a licensee to pay for
rights that he does not want: "A patent empowers the
owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with
the leverage of that monopoly." "'
CoRPoiATE PROBLEMS
A client need not leave his corporate grounds, how-
ever, to have trade regulation problems. Size, conspiracy
and other antitrust issues, like charity, may begin at home.
These problems, unless otherwise noted, relate primarily to
the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts. It is
Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Co., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir. 1959),
.cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902; Prestole Corp. v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 271 F2d
146 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960).
35 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 401 (1948).
ss Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950); Sbicca-Del Mac, Inc. v. Milius Shoe Co., 145 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.
1944); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 901; Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v.
Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1, 49-50 (D. Md. 1963), aff'd, 327 F2d
497 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826.
37 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
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now in order to turn from external to these intracorporate
questions, commencing with the issue of size.
Corporate Size
For years-to be candid about it-we have been pass-
ing through an open season on big business. Nostalgic Lil-
liputians have longed for the good old days of the small
carriage-maker instead of General Motors, the housewife's
knitted stockings in preference to du Pont's nylons, and
the fish pond's ice instead of General Electric's refrigera-
tors. Divestiture proponents, like the Queen in Alice in
TVonderland, have ordered "off with their heads" at the
mere sight of large corporations. We suggest, however,
that it has come to be recognized, at last that bigness
throughout the world-in government, in unions and in
business-is here to stay, whether we like it or not. For
the courts have hesitated to play the role of Madame De-
farge, except where size is based upon unlawful acquisi-
tions, with the result that corporate heads do not normally
roll into the antitrust basket.3" In spite of statements
that size may be presumed to be unlawful,39 and other in-
fiammatory judicial dicta,4" large as well as small com-
panies are normally deemed to be acceptable members of
our business community.
It follows -that both big business and little business
are currently being upheld in their bona fide selection of
customers,41 negotiation of prices, 2 allocation of supplies, 3
38 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 862-77 (D.NJ.
1953).
39 United States v. Grinnell, 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd on other
grounds, 34 U.S.L. W=ax 4507 (U.S. June 13, 1966).
40 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).4 1 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953).
42FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958); Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).4 3 Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922; United Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 245 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1965).
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and nonpredatory internal growth.44 The law seems to be
that there is no limit to the permissible internal growth of
a company, provided that the large organization:
[O]wes its monopoly solely to superior skill, superior products,
natural advantages, (including accessibility to raw materials or
markets), economic or technological efficiency, (including scientific
research), low margins of profit maintained permanently and without
discrimination, or licenses conferred by, and used within, the limits
of law, (including patents on one's own inventions, or franchises
granted directly to the enterprise by a public authority).45
Current cases, when viewed in the light of past deci-
sions and contemporaneous views on the competitive objec-
tives of our antitrust laws, nevertheless, indicate that the
relationships of a corporation which is large, when com-
pared with its buyers and competitors, should continue to
be subjected to greater scrutiny in the future than those
of a smaller company. While absolute size is not in and
of itself an offense," relative size does provide an opportu-
nity for abuse 47 and necessarily affords a more readily iden-
tifiable target." For example, long-term leasing which in
and of itself is laudable may be found in future decisions
to be a deadly device -to exclude competitors if practiced by
a lessor controlling seventy-five per cent and more of an
industry.49 Again, corporate integration is entirely lawful,
but where the leverage of a monopoly position of one cor-
porate division is utilized to give a controlling competitive
44 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956);
Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.
Mo. 1953); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., CCH 1965 Trade Cas.
1171,552 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
45 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
46 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927);
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
47 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
48 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).49 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 and 324 U.S. 570(1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ; United States v. Pullman Co., 50
F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943), 53 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1944) and 64 F.
Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1946), affd by an equally divided court, 330 U.S. 806(1947).
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advantage to another division, it may be held to be unlaw-
ful." Other practices such as the threat of a parent to com-
pete with its customers through a subsidiary, unless these
customers purchase exclusively from the parent;1 the coer-
cive use of reciprocity, by which the purchasing power of
one corporate unit is used to require its suppliers to pur-
chase from another unit of the corporation;52 and the use
of the profits of a parent 3 or division to subsidize preda-
tory pricing by another solvent branch of the corporate
family, all represent conduct whose legality becomes ques-
tionable in direct proportion to the size of the corporation
involved. In short, size which is large when compared
with others in an industry-when accompanied by exclu-
sionary practices that are merely irritating in the hands
of the weak but lethal in the hands of the strong-may
add up to attempted monopolization:
[W]e reject the idea that success and resultant bigness in a com-
pany makes it a threat to our free competitive system But in a
field where large and small companies compete, the larger ones
must be especially careful to stay within the rules. Size brings
with it increased responsibilities, commensurate with its increased
power.55
Under the law as now developing, a large company
must be highly conscious of its strength, cautious in add-
ing to its power and careful to refrain from controlling the
market place. Such a company may find it necessary to
assume certain aspects of public-utility obligations, depend-
50 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) ; Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) ; United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5l FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
52 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (1963), aft'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1963); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., CCH 1965 Trade Cas.
71,518 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931) ; Mechan-
ical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379
(1937).
53United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); United
States v. New York Great A&P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
54 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aft'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
55 Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954).
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ing upon its industry. But the large companies will not,
and should not, disappear, since:
[C]onsiderable size is often essential for efficient operation in re-
search, manufacture and distribution."
Corporate Agreements
While direct attacks upon the size of a company seem
currently to be blunted, there remains an indirect form of
challenge frequently -utilized in the past. This device for
attacking corporations of large size has been the so-called
"bathtub" conspiracy theory, which views the corporation
as sitting in the corporate bathtub, shut off from customers
and competitors, and conspiring with its subsidiary limbs
to restrain trade through concerted selection of customers
or suppliers,57 allocation of markets," and other devices to
control the market. 9
The present more reasonable approach of the courts
would seem to suggest future rulings dealing less kindly
with this disguised form of attack upon corporate size. It
is believed -that a company-whether big or small-will be
permitted to choose customers, quote prices and determine
sales markets through whatever internal arrangements it
may elect to utilize."0 The officers and subsidiaries may
5 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386
(1956).
57 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Schen-
ley Indus., Inc., 3 CCH 1965 TRADE Rw. REP. ir 17,353; United States v. New
York Great A&P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
58 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 311 (N.D.
Ohio 1949), modified and aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
59 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948);
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
618, rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 710; see United States v. Richfield Oil Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952).
60 Shoenberg Farms v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 266 (D.
Colo. 1964); see, e.g., Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821; Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925;
Marion County Co-op Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark.
1953); Brehm v. Goebel Brewing Co., CCH 1952-1953 Trade Cas. ir 67,431
(W.D. Mich. 1953); cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495
(1948); Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956).
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be "conspiring" on these occasions, but-if so--they are
"conspiring" solely to enable their corporation to take rea-
sonable, lawful action:
[T]o hold otherwise would be to impose grave legal consequences
upon organizational distinctions that are of de rninimis meaning
and effect... .1
Recent rulings further suggest, however, that a com-
pany's officers, agents and subsidiaries may not reach out
beyond those normal and proper intracorporate matters to
engage in traditionally unlawful antitrust conspiracies.
Thus they may not elect to represent to the public that a
subsidiary is an independent competitor and thereafter
agree with it to boycott third persons.2 Likewise they
may not buy control of the major competitor of the corpo-
ration and thereupon claim immunity-by reason of the
captive status of their acquisition-for a pre-existing com-
bination to restrain competition between them.3  Again
they may not seek by internal concert of action to monopo-
lize either the commerce of customers 4 or that of com-
petitors. 5 The form of their internal corporate relation-
ships, in short, should neither condemn nor commend their
actions under the antitrust laws. As explained in the
General Motors case, where it was argued that the defend-
ants were all individual or corporate units of one organ-
ization:
61 Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S.
19, 29 (1962).02 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951); Schenley Indus., Inc., 3 CCH 1965 TPADE: REG. REP. 1 17,353; United
States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), final decree
entered, 230 Fed. 522 (W.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578
(1921).6(3 United States m. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).04 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) ; United States
v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
618, rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 710.
10 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948);
White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.
1942) ; Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied,
238 U.S. 635; Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. v. H. Harris & Co., 152 F. Supp.
702 (D. Mass. 1957), aft'd, 260 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 984.
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[T]he appellants [cannot] enjoy the benefits of separate corporate
identity and escape the consequences of an illegal combination in
restraint of trade by insisting that they are in effect a single trader.
The test of illegality under the Sherman Act is not so much the
particular form of business organization effected, as it is the
presence or absence of restraint of trade and commerce.6
Gorporate Acquisitions
The most troublesome problem of many large corpora-
lions today is not size or internal agreements, however, but
that of growth through acquisitions. Section 7 of the
Clayton Act- and to a certain extent section 1 of the Sher-
man and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Acts-
stand in the way of rapid growth in a line of commerce
through the corporate purchases of stock or assets.
The antitrust laws generally oppose 6he expansion of
a substantial corporation through its acquisition of the
stock or assets of a competing unit or division of another
substantial company. The political objective of preserving
the market structure of vigorously competing buyers and
sellers would be frustrated if the horizontal merger of such
competitors were freely sanctioned. Accordingly, the mer-
ger of a company representing a large share of the market
with a solvent substantial competitor has been condemned
out of hand." A series of such acquisitions of competitors
by a substantial corporation has also been held to be un-
lawful." Even large companies competing in the sale of
alternative forms of a product,"9 or representing mere poten-
66 United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 404 (7th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618, rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 710.
7 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964) ; United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
68 National Tea Co., 3 CCH 1966 TRADE REG. REP. 17,463; Beatrice
Foods Co., 3 CCH 1965 TRADE RE. REP. 1 17,244; Fruehauf Trailer Co.,
3 CCH 1965 TADE REG. REP. 1 17,260; United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); cf.
Martin-Marietta Corp., CCH 1963 TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer
Binder) 16,335 (consent order).
69United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
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tial sources of the same product7 have been barred from
merging their businesses.
The Supreme Court has ruled, with respect to the
legality of horizontal mergers under section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, that:
[I]t is the basic premise of that law that competition will be most
vital when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant
market share .
7
All mergers of competitors, of course, are not pro-
hibited. Thus, small competitors are permitted to bind
themselves together in order to provide a sufficiently large
economic raft on which to ride out a competitive storm. 2
Also, both large and small may acquire competitive busi-
nesses which are unable to operate profitably. 3 Neverthe-
less, it seems clear that the eye of the antitrust needle is
steadily narrowing for acquisitions or mergers involving
healthy dynamic competitors. 4
The antitrust laws, moreover, would appear increas-
ingly to raise doubts with respect to the legality of the
expansion of a corporation through its acquisition of the
stock or assets of certain other substantial companies,
whether or not they are competitors. Thus, judicial deci-
sions and enforcement actions during the past few years
reflect a growing tendency to question substantial mergers
and acquisitions involving large companies where a major
supplier or customer of the acquiring company is involved.
For example, the acquisition by a large supplier of over
twenty per cent of the stock of a customer representing a
substantial share of its consumer market has been pro-
hibited; and other major mergers which have integrated a
7 0 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
72 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964).
72 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 34 U.S.L. Waan 4425, 4427
(U.S. May 31, 1966) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319
(1962) ; H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Cf. United States
v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
7 "United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); cf. United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
74 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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seller with its customers have been proscribed."5 In addi-
tion, a dominant corporation must even debate whether or
not to acquire other corporations which are neither com-
petitors, suppliers, nor customers, where the probable effect
of such a conglomerate acquisition-by reason of such
factors as reciprocity or combination of resources-may be
substantially to Increase its competitive strength."'
Here also the courts have stressed that:
We cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentral-
ization.7 7
Mergers and acquisitions as yet are not, and should not
be, condemned merely because they involve large companies.
The merger-minded executive dreaming today of expanding
his corporate borders through acquisitions, nevertheless,
should keep in mind -that there are those occupying the
seats of judgment who would oppose almost any significant
corporate acquisition. It is -the view of these judicial
Canutes that the current wave of mergers must be stopped,
regardless of the business reasons which may be advanced
for an individual acquisition.
Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive
economy. It therefore proscribed anti-competitive mergers, the
benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we assume, that some
price had to be paid.7
8
75 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo.
1964), af'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965); United States v. Kennecott
Copper Co., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 414 (1965);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Maryland & Va.
Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); Reynolds Metals
Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
10 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) ; Ekco Prods.
Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965) ; Scott Paper Co., CCH 1964 TPAD.
REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) f 16,705; Proctor & Gamble Co.,
CCH 1963 TRADem REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 16,673, revd, 357
F.2d - (6th Cir. 1966).
77 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
78 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963);
accord, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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